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ABSTRACT. The concept of strict dominance provides a technique that 
can be used normatively to predict the play of games based only on 
the assumption of individual rationality. Such predictions, unlike those 
based on Nash equilibria, do not depend on players' beliefs about the 
behaviour of others. One strategy strictly dominates another if and only 
if the payoff from the first strategy is strictly greater than the payoff 
from the second, no matter how the opponent(s) plays. It is possible 
for iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies to remove all but 
a single choice for each player, in which case we say that the game is 
strict-dominance solvable. Analysis of games with continuous strategy 
spaces reveals necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoff functions 
for strict-dominance solvability. These conditions will be identified first 
for symmetric two-player games with quadratic payoff functions, and 
then extended to higher-order payoff functions and asymmetric games. 
The conditions discovered can be applied to specific games, producing 
conclusions that can be compared to other solutions of those games. 
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1. Introduction 
The mathematical game is "the simplest and most powerful model to 
analyze situations involving mixed motives" [8]. Since its origination by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern in their work Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior (1944), game theory has been applied to the social sciences to 
provide a model for the analysis of any situation where multiple agents 
influence the outcome and have differing interests. This tool has been used 
to glean information about a wide class of interactions, with the games 
falling under a myriad of classifications. 
A non-cooperative game T = (N; Si,..., Sn; Hi,..., Un) consists of a set 
of players, N = { 1 , . . . ,n}, each of which has a set of possible strategies, 
Si,.. . , Sn, sometimes called pure strategies. The choice of a particular 
strategy Xj £ Si by every player % will determine an outcome of the game. 
Players' values for outcomes are measured by utilities [11]; player i's utility 
for the outcome that results from strategies [x\,X2, • • • ,xn) is given by i's 
payoff function Flj( ). "Rational" players do the best they can for 
themselves through their choice of strategy (see below). 
Depending on the interaction that is being modeled, other considerations 
may be taken into account. The players may or may not have complete 
information about the identity and number of their opponents, and the pref-
erences of those opponents. Communication among players might or might 
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not be allowed. Choices might be made in a specific order, or simultane-
ously. The game might only be played once, a certain number of times, or 
indefinitely. Random events might be involved at some stage. 
Game theory then seeks to predict how the game will unfold given that 
the players are "rational", where "rational" is used to describe a course of 
action which is best for the player, and to describe a player who chooses such 
a course of action [7]. Will a specific outcome be determined? Can some 
outcomes be determined to be impossible under rational play? In some 
cases, equilibrium choices can be found such that players who anticipate the 
equilibrium are disinclined to depart from it. Such an equilibrium can be 
taken possible solution to the game. 
1.1. Non-Cooperat ive G a m e Theory and N a s h Equilibria. Non-Cooperative 
game theory is the study of games in which players act on their own to 
achieve the most preferable (greatest utility) outcome. Communication be-
tween players is usually assumed to be impossible. 
A common solution concept for non-cooperative games is Nash equilib-
rium. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy selection for every player, or strategy 
profile, such that no player has a rational inclination to change his or her 
strategy if the other players play theirs. 
Formally, a strategy profile (x\,. .. , xn) G S in an n-person strategic-form 
game T is a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium if and only if I I j ( : r i , . . . , xn) > 
Il j(a;i , . . . ,£„|:r-) for all i G N and x\ € Si [7]. Here (xi,... ,a;n|x-) is the 
same strategy profile as (,Xi,..., xn) except that player i uses x\ in place of 
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x%. If the inequality is strict for all x\ ^ x?;, the strategy profile is known as 
a strict Nash equilibrium. 
Example 1.1. Let the following matrix describe a game between two players 
where elements of Player l's strategy set correspond to rows and elements 
of Player 2's strategy set correspond to columns. The first entry in each 
position of the matrix is the payoff to Player 1, and the second to Player 2. 
Games in this form are called bimatrix games. 
C\ C*2 C3 
Rx (5,2) (2,3) (0,6) 
R2 (2,4) (1,1) (1,3) 
R3 (0,3) (4,4) (3,0) 
There is a Nash Equilibrium at position (i?3, C2) with a payoff of 4 to each 
player. This can be seen to be a Nash equilibrium by examining the payoffs 
to either player should the other player's strategy remain fixed. Neither 
player would do better by switching. In fact, the unique Nash equilibrium 
of Example 1.1 is (-R3, C2) 
The concept of Nash equilibrium does not provide a clear solution to all 
games. Nash equilibria may fail to exist, or there may be more than one 
Nash equilibrium in a game. 
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Example 1.2. The following bimatrix game has no Nash equilibria. 
C\ C2 
Rx (3,5) (2,4) 
R* (5,0) (0,8) 
Rs (7,2) (1,3) 
Example 1.3. The following bimatrix game has Nash equilibria at (Ri, C\) 
and(i?,2 ,C3) . 
C\ C'2 C3 
Rx (6,5) (2,2) (2,2) 
R2 (2,4) (0,3) (4,7) 
Note that the players' preferences over the two Nash equilibria are opposed. 
A Nash equilibrium may require choices that do not seem rational. 
Example 1.4. [8] The only Nash Equilibrium in this game is at position 
(R2, C2) with a payoff of 2 to each player. 
C\ C2 C-j, 
fli (1,3) (2,0) (3,1) 
R2 (0,2) (2,2) (0,2) 
R3 (3,1) (2,0) (1,3) 
This outcome, however, requires the players to choose strategies R2 and C2, 
which can be argued to be irrational. For Player 1, strategies i?4 and R3 
always provide at least as great a payoff as strategy R2, and in two out of 
three cases, pay strictly more. It is thus said that strategy R2 is weakly 
dominated by strategy Ri and by strategy i?,3. The situation is identical for 
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Player 2's strategies. Thus the principle that a rational player would never 
choose a dominated strategy seems counter to the view that Nash equilibria 
describe rational play. 
A strategy £i is a weakly dominated strategy if and only if there is a 
different strategy x* such that 
(1) I l j (x i , . . . ,xn\x*) > I I j (a: i , . . . , xn\£i) for all (xi,..., xn) E S, and 
(2) for some (xj,...,xn) e S, H ^ , . . . ,xn\x*) > U^Xj,... ,xn\£i) [7]. 
Thus in the above example, i?2 and C^ are weakly dominated strategies. 
1.2. Str ict -Dominance Solvability. Example 1.4 showed a weakly domi-
nated strategy. If, instead, a strategy is always better than a second strategy, 
it is said that the first strategy strictly dominates the second. As illustrated 
next, it is possible for iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies 
to remove all but a single choice for all players, in which case we say that 
the game is strict-dominance solvable. The solution of a strict-dominance 
solvable game with finite strategy spaces provided by strict dominance must 
be a Nash equilibrium; moreover, a prediction based on strict-dominance 
solvability does not depend on a players' beliefs about the behaviour of 
others, unlike predictions based on Nash equilibrium. (For a formal defini-
tion of strict-dominance solvability, see Chapter 2 for symmetric games and 
Chapter 3 for asymmetric games, such as Example 1.5 below.) 
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E x a m p l e 1.5. Consider the following bimatrix game. 
C\ C2 C3 
Rx (4,2) (2,0) (3,4) 
R2 (1,3) (1,3) (2,1) 
R3 (2,1) (2,1) (2,2) 
Player 1 always receives a strictly better payoff from strategy R\ than from 
strategy R2, so R2 can be eliminated from the game. The resulting bimatrix 
is 
C\ C2 C3 
^1 (4,2) (2,0) (3,4) 
R3 (2,1) (2,1) (2,2) 
Player 2's strategies C\ and C2 are now strictly dominated by C3, and so 
both C\ and C2 are eliminated from the game. Notice that neither C\ nor 
C2 were dominated in the original game. The game is now 
C3 
Ri (3,4) 
Rs (2,2) 
Now Ri strictly dominates R3. After this round of elimination the game is 
reduced to a single choice for each player, 
C3 
Ri (3,4) 
Therefore, the game is strict-dominance solvable, and the solution is (i?i, C3) 
resulting in a payoff of (3,4). 
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The concept of strict dominance thus provides a technique that can be 
used normatively to predict the play of games based only on a very strict 
criterion of individual rationality. 
1.3. T h e Snowdrift Game. One of the more famous examples of non-
cooperative game theory, the Snowdrift (SD) game models an interaction 
between two drivers who are blocked on either side of an intervening snow-
drift [4]. Both players have the options of removing the snowdrift or staying 
in the car and doing nothing. The latter option is the best choice as it leaves 
all of the work up to the other player; however, if that player also opts to 
stay in the car, then neither will ever get to their destination. This model 
can similarly be used to represent situations where cooperation by one of the 
players creates a common good that can be exploited by others, but where 
a player may be better off cooperating if no one else is, despite the prospect 
of being exploited. This game is also identical to the game Chicken [7]. In 
matrix notation, the discrete (two strategy) Snowdrift game appears as 
C D 
C ( 6 - f , 6 - f) (b-c,b) 
D (b,b-c) (0,0) 
where b, the benefit to cooperating, outweighs c, the cost (b > c > 0). 
Thus the game is differentiated from the famous (two strategy) Prisoner's 
Dilemma (PD) by the fact that it is always better to cooperate when your 
opponent defects. Also, unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma, the SD game does 
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not have a symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (see Definition 2.3 
and Example 2.4 below) and so is not strictly dominance solvable. 
1.4. Continuous Strategy Spaces. The previous examples are all games 
in which there is a finite number of strategies for each player, but often games 
with continuous strategy spaces are used to fashion models. These strategy 
spaces are typically intervals of the real line, and thus offer an uncountably 
infinite number of possible strategy choices to each player. 
The use of continuous strategy spaces brings many new problems, as most 
of the ideas discussed above depend on finite strategy spaces. If there are 
an uncountable number of strategies, can a solution be found by strict dom-
inance in a finite (or countable) number of steps? Is the solution provided 
by strict dominance guaranteed to be a Nash equilibrium? 
1.5. The Snowdrift G a m e in Continuous Strategy Spaces. Consider 
the case if cooperative investments are allowed to vary continuously in the 
SD game. Investments should yield a benefit not only to the opponents, but 
also to the investing player. If x, y G [0,1] are the investments of players 
1 and 2 respectively, then the payoff to player 1 is Hi(x, y) •= B\[x + y) — 
Ci{x) and the payoff to player 2 is n 2 (x ,y ) = B2(x + y) — Cziy), where 
Bi(x + y) specifies the benefit to player i obtained from the total cooperative 
investment made by both players, and Ci(x) specifies the cost incurred to 
player i because of their own investment [4]. In section 2.1.3 it will be shown 
that for certain benefit and cost functions, the continuous SD game becomes 
strict-dominance solvable. 
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1.6. Goals. The concept of strict dominance is well known. It is not known, 
however, under which conditions certain classes of games are strict-dominance 
solvable, particularly in the case of games with continuous strategy spaces. 
This thesis will provide conditions under which specific classes of games are 
strict-dominance solvable. Further, there is the problem of how to identify 
rational behaviour in a finite game, a problem that is even more difficult for 
continuous games. This thesis explores one answer to this question: When a 
game is strict-dominance solvable to a strategy x*, then x* is the only pos-
sible outcome under rational play, and therefore there can be no ambiguity 
about what choices are 'best' for rational players. 
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2. Symmetric Games 
A game is called symmetric if permuting the players cannot change the 
strategic problem facing any player. The SD game in Section 1.3 is an exam-
ple of a two strategy symmetric game. In general, a two-player symmetric 
game T = (2; Si = S, S2 = S; Ilj — II, Il2 = II is defined by a strategy set, S, 
and a payoff function II : S x S —» R where H(x, z) is the payoff to strategy 
x when the opponent chooses strategy z. Let T C S. In a two-player sym-
metric game, strategy x G S strictly dominates strategy y G S with respect 
to T if and only if H(x, z) > II(y, z) for all z G T. Note that if T = S, x 
strictly dominates y. 
Definition 2.1. A symmetric two-player game T, with payoff function IT and 
pure strategy set S is strict-dominance solvable (SDS) [2] to x* G S if there 
is a finite or countable sequence of subsets of S, S = So D Si D S2 D • • •, 
called a reduction sequence for x*, such that 
(1) Si+i is a proper subset of Si. 
(2) For every y G Sj \ S,;+i there is an ar G SV+i such that x strictly 
dominates y with respect to Si. 
(3) n $ = {**}• 
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Example 2.2. Consider the following symmetric bimatrix game with S = 
So = {1,2,3}. 
C\ C*2 C3 
Rx (4,4) (2,2) (3,1) 
R2 (2,2) (1,1) (1,3) 
R3 (1,3) (3,1) (0,0) 
Strategy 2 is strictly dominated by strategy 1, and once it is removed, the 
resulting game looks like 
C\ C3 
Rx (4,4) (3,1) 
R, (1,3) (0,0) 
Now strategy 3 is strictly dominated with respect to the new strategy space 
Si = {1,3} by strategy 1. Note that it is not true that strategy 3 is strictly 
dominated with respect to the original strategy space S = So = {1,2,3}. 
When strategy 3 is removed the game is reduced to 
Ci 
Ri (4,4) 
Hence, by Definition 2.1, this game is SDS to strategy 1 with payoff (4,4) 
by the reduction sequence So = {1,2,3}, Si = {1,3}, and S2 = {1}. 
Definition 2.3. If (x, x) is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium for a symmetric 
game T, i.e. if U(x,x) > U(y,x) for all y E S, then x is called a symmetric 
Nash equilibrium (NE). The strategy x is called a strict Nash equilibrium 
(SNE) if the inequality is strict whenever j / / x . Note that there are other 
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definitions of Nash equilibrium concepts, but this is the only one that will 
be used here. 
Example 2.4. Consider the two strategy SD game. 
C D 
C ( 6 - f , 6 - f) (b-c,b) 
D (b,b-c) (0,0) 
Assuming that b > c > 0, both (D, C) and (C, D) are Nash equilibria, 
however, neither are symmetric Nash equilibria. 
Theorem 2.5. IfY is a symmetric game that is SDS to x* G S, and x* is 
a NE, then x* is a SNE. 
Proof. Assume that x* is not a SNE. Therefore for some y G S with y / x * , 
n(j/, cc*) > H(x*,x*). Let Si be the final subset in a reduction sequence for 
x* such that y G Si. Hence there exists a z G Si+i such that 11(2;, a;*) > 
Il(y,,x*) > H(x*,x*) which contradicts the assumption that X IS ct NE. D 
Even more than this, Moulin proves in [8] that if T is SDS to x* for any 
game with continuous payoffs on compact strategy spaces, then X IS Q, NE. 
Thus by the above theorem, if T is SDS to x* in such a game, then x* is a 
SNE, and by the Theorem below, it is the unique NE. For examples where 
x* is not a NE please refer to [5]. 
Theorem 2.6. IfT is SDS to x*, and x is a NE ofT, then x* = x. 
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Proof. Assume that x* ^ x. Thus x must be eliminated at some stage k in 
the reduction sequence, and so there exists a y £ Sk such that H(y,x) > 
Il(x, x), contradicting the fact that x is a NE. • 
Corollary 2.7. If x is a NE ofT, then x is a member of every subset in 
any reduction sequence for xofY. 
2.1. Symmetr ic Games W i t h Quadratic Payoff Functions and One 
Dimensional Strategy Spaces. 
2.1.1. Interior Symmetric NE. All of the results of this section assume that 
the strategy set S is of the form [—l,k] for some l,k > 0, that the NE is 
x* = 0, and that the payoff function is quadratic. This can be achieved for 
any game Y with a quadratic payoff function, a compact one-dimensional 
strategy space and an interior NE, by a translation of coordinates so that 
the coefficient of the linear term in a player's own strategies is equal to 0. 
Theorem 2.8. Fix k, I > 0 and let Tk,i be the symmetric game with S = 
[—1, k] and payoff function II : S x S —> M given by H(x,y) = ax2 + bxy + 
cy2 + dx + ey + f, where a, b, c, d, e, and f are constants. Then: 
(1) x = 0 is d NE for r \ j if and only if d = 0 and a < 0. 
(2) If a = d — 0, then there are no x,y E S such that x strictly dominates 
y-
Thus a necessary condition for T^i to be SDS to x = 0 is d = 0 and a < 0. 
In this case x = 0 is the unique NE. 
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Proof. (1) Assume that x = 0 is a NE. This means that 11(0, 0) > U(y, 0) 
for all y G S, or equivalently, that 0 > y(ay + d). For small values of 
\y\, if d 7^  0, the rf term dominates the ay term, so the only value of 
d that guarantees 0 > dy is d = 0. Assuming c/ = 0, 0 > y(ay + d) 
becomes 0 > ay2. Because y2 is nonnegative, only a < 0 guarantees 
that 0 > CM/2 for all y. 
(2) Assume that a — d = 0, and that there exists some x,y <E S such 
that Il(x, z) > n(y, z) for all z E S. This gives 6x2 + cz2 + ez + f > 
byz + cz2 + ez + f which simplifies to bxz > byz. Substituting z = 0 
into this inequality yields the obvious contradiction 0 > 0. 
The remainder of the proof follows from Corollary 2.7 • 
Now the necessary and sufficient conditions for a game of this class to be 
SDS to x = 0 are found. 
Theorem 2.9. Fix k, I > 0 and let Tfcj; be the symmetric 2 player game 
with continuous payoff function II : [—/, k] x [—I, k] —> R where U(x,y) = 
ax
2
 + bxy + cy2 + dx + ey + f, and a, b, c, d, e, and f are constants. Then 
Tkii is SDS to 0 and 0 is a NE if and only if a < 0, d = 0, and 
(2.1) 2 > 
Proof Assume that (2.1) holds, and that a < 0 and d = 0. By Theorem 
2.8, 0 is a NE. Define S = <So,o- Let k > I and let y > k — \ek = kE, where 
e > 0 will be chosen later. For Yl(k(l — e), z) > H(y, z) to be true for every 
14 
z G [—1, k] and every y > k£, 
(2.2) a(k(l - e)f + bk(l - e)z > ay2 + byz, 
or 
y2-(k(l~e))2>^(y~k(l-s)). 
Because y > k — |efc, y — k(l — e) > 0. Therefore, dividing both sides of the 
inequality by y — fc(l — e) shows that for all z <G [—1, k] (2.2) is equivalent to 
(2.3)
 y + A ; ( i _ e ) > ^ . 
a 
To show that (2.3) is true, note that the left side is at least k (l — |e) + 
k(l — e) = 2k — | e , and the right side is at most I -1 fc < I-1 fc if 6 > 0 since 
v
 ' 2 ' ° la l — la l — 
it is maximized by z = k, and at most | £ | /if 6 < 0 since it is maximized by 
z = —/. Hence (2.2) is true if 
I a I 
k ( 1 - ~£ ) + fc(l - e) > fc, 
which is true provided e < | (2 — | ^ | ) . 
In particular, if 2 — |~| > | e > 0 then each strategy y > k — \ek is 
dominated by the strategy x = k(l — e). Fix an e with 0 < £ < | (2 — |£|) 
and let the subset So,i be the interval [—l,k (l — | ) ] . It has been shown 
that every y G So$ \ 5o,i is strictly dominated by x = k(l — e) £ So,i-
Since k can have any positive value, the procedure can be repeated. There-
fore, define S*( 0,i /, k (l — | ) 1 , and continue until / > k (l — | ) ° for 
some i0 G N. Define S^o = [—/, /] 
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Similar calculations show that for the same value of e the strategies y < 
—I + \el are dominated by the strategy x — —1(1 — e) and y > I — \el are 
dominated by the strategy x = 1(1 — e). Accordingly, let the subset S^i be 
the interval [—1 (l — | ) , I (l — | ) ] . Each y G S ,IIO\5'I,I is strictly dominated 
by either x — 1(1 - e) G Siti or x = - / ( l - e) G ^ i^ . 
Since / can have any positive value, this procedure can also be repeated. 
Define Si ,• = l(\-l)\l{\- lY . Since (Hill So,) f] ( ^ 5M) = {0}, 
I \ i is SDS to 0. The same result can be obtained starting with / > k. 
Conversely, assume Tkj is SDS to 0 and 0 is an NE, but that (2.1) fails. 
Theorem 2.8 shows that a < 0 and d — 0. Let I > k and let Si be a reduction 
sequence for x* = 0. 
Let Sj be the last subset of S including both k and —k. Suppose k is 
dominated by w E Sj with respect to Sj. Then w < k and U(w, z) > Tl(k, z) 
for all z G Sj. In particular, if z = 0, we must have 
aw2 > ak2. 
Dividing both sides by a gives 
w2 < fc2, 
that is, \w\ < \k\. 
Further, for strategy k to be strictly dominated, it must be true that 
Ti(w, z) > H(k, z) for z = k. Expanding this inequality gives 
aw2 + bwk + ck2 + ek + f > ak2 + bk2 + ck2 + ek + f, 
16 
or more simply, 
\a\{k2-w2) > {bk)(k-w). 
Because k — w > 0, U(w, k) > U(k, k) is equivalent to 
bk k + w > — \a\ 
or, because 2k > k + w, 
n
 l
, i b 
2 > -(k + w) > -—j. 
k \a\ 
The assumption that (2.1) is false then implies that b < 0. 
However, for k to be dominated by w, it must also be true that H(w, —k) > 
H(k, —k). Expanding and simplifying this inequality exactly as above pro-
duces 
2 > -(w + k) > -—: k \a\ 
which, by the same argument, implies b > 0, a contradiction. A similar 
contradiction can be reached by considering when the strategy —A: is domi-
nated. 
Hence the strict-dominance reduction sequence cannot proceed past Sj. 
Thus Tkj[ cannot be strictly dominance solvable to x = 0. D 
This result is important as it gives a definite and precise requirement 
for a symmetric 2 player game with quadratic payoff functions on compact 
interval strategy spaces to be SDS to an interior Nash equilibrium. For 
games r ^ that satisfy the conditions of the above theorem, an interior Nash 
17 
equilibrium is a very strong candidate for a solution to I \ ; because there is 
no doubt as to its rationality. Here such games will be considered solved. 
It is interesting to note that the conditions for such a game to be SDS to 
an interior NE rely only on the terms in the payoff function that concern a 
player's own strategy, and do not depend on those which concern only the 
strategic choice of the opponent. As will be shown below, this observation 
generalizes to other games. 
2.1.2. Boundary Symmetric NE. The discussion in the previous section con-
cerns cases where the game is strictly dominance solvable to a strategy in 
the interior the strategy space. The conditions are slightly relaxed for a 
game to be strictly dominance solvable to an endpoint. 
Theorem 2.10. Suppose Tk is a symmetric game with payoff II : Sx S —> R. 
given by H(x, y) = ax2 + bxy + cy2 + dx + ey + / where a, b, c, d, e, and f 
are constants, and S = [0, k] for some k > 0. Then: 
(1) If x = 0 is a NE for all Fk, then d < 0 and a < 0. 
(2) If a — 0 and Tj, is SDS to 0 for every k > 0, then d < 0. 
Thus if I\. is SDS to x = 0 for all k, then a < 0 and d < 0 but a = 0 and 
d = 0 cannot both be true. 
Proof. (1) Assume that x = 0 is a NE. This means that 11(0, 0) > U(y, 0), 
or equivalently, that 0 > y(ay + d). Since y > 0, ay + d < 0 for all 
y 7^  0. If d > 0, there exists a 0 < y < k such that ay + d > 0. Thus 
d < 0. Now assume that a > 0. Given the value of d, there can exist 
18 
a positive value of y such that ay + d > 0 given large enough k. Thus 
a< 0. 
(2) The proof that a and d cannot both be equal to 0 is exactly the same 
as the analogous proof in Theorem 2.8. The fact that a cannot be 
greater than 0 follows from the first part of this theorem and the fact 
that, if Tfe is SDS to 0, then 0 must be a NE. 
• 
Statements (1) and (2) in the above theorem hold only for the class of 
games on S = [0, k] for any k. Given a fixed value for k or a limit on k 
neither is necessarily true (see Theorem 2.14 below). For now, the discussion 
continues to assume that the conditions of Theorem 2.10 are to hold for every 
positive value of k. 
L e m m a 2 .11 . Let T^ be a symmetric 2 player game with continuous payoff 
function II : [0, k] x [0, k] —> M for any k > 0 where H(x, y) — ax2 + bxy + 
cy2 + dx + ey + f,a = 0 and b, c, d, e, and f are constants. Then Tk is 
SDS to 0 for all k if and only if d < 0 and b < 0. 
Proof. Assume that a = 0, d < 0 and b < 0. Consider 11(0, z) > Tl(x,z). 
This inequality expands and simplifies to 
0 > bxz + dx. 
This is true for all x, z G S = [0, k] where x ^ 0. Therefore any strategy 
x £ S such that x ^ 0 is strictly dominated with respect to S and Yk is SDS 
to 0 in one step. 
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Now assume that Yk is SDS to 0. The proof that if a = 0 then d < 0 is 
one conclusion of Theorem 2.10. Note that Yk is SDS to 0 so there must 
exist some strict dominance in Yk- Thus there exist some x,y £E S = [0, k] 
such that U(x, z) > U(y, z) for any z € S. This gives 
bxz + cz2 + dx + ez + f > byz + cz2 + dy + ez + f 
which simplifies to 
bz(x — y) > d(y — x). 
Recall that d < 0, and so 
bz(x-y) > \d\(x-y). 
Assume x > y. It then follows that bz > \d\ which is false when z = 0. 
Now assume that x < y, and so bz < \d\. This can be true for any value of 
0 < z < k only if b < 0 since k is arbitrarily large. • 
Now the necessary and sufficient conditions for a game of this class to be 
SDS to x = 0. 
Theorem 2.12. Let Y^ be a symmetric 2 player game with continuous payoff 
function II : [0, k] x [0, k] —> K. for any k > 0 where H(x, y) — ax2 + bxy + 
cy'2 + dx + ey + f, and a, b, c, d, e, and f are constants. Then Y^ is SDS 
to 0 for all k if and only if one of the following cases hold 
(1) a< 0, d< 0, and2 > ±. 
(2) a = 0, d < 0, and b<0. 
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Proof. The proof of the sufficient conditions for strict-dominance solvability 
will be divided into several cases where it is shown that F^ is SDS to 0 in 
each case. 
Case la: a < 0, d = 0, b > 0, and 2 > A . This case follows from the 
proof for Theorem 2.9. 
Case lb : a < 0, d = 0, b < 0. Let y > \k. thus 11(0, z) > II(y, z) for all 
z G S since 
II(y, z) - 11(0, z) = ay2 + fo/z < ay2 < 0. 
Thus let S\ = [0, |fc). This is true for any positive value of k, so similarly 
define Si = [0, {\)%k). With this definition, as i —> oo, max{|x| : x E Si} —* 
0. Therefore I \ is SDS to 0. 
Case lc: a < 0, d < 0, 6 < 0. Consider 11(0,2) > U(x,z), which reduces 
to 0 > ax2 + byx + dx. This is also true for any x G S where x ^ 0, and Tk 
is reduced to the strategy 0 in one step. 
Case Id: a < 0, d < 0, b > 0, and 2 > ^ . Let y > A; ( l - | e ) , with £ > 0 
to be defined later. Consider H(k(l — e), z) > U(y, z). This expands to 
(2.4) 
a(k(l-£))2+b(k(l-s))z+cz2+dk(l-e)+ez+f > ay2+byz+cz2+dy+ez+f 
and then simplifies to 
y2~(k(l-e))2>b~±~(y-k(l-e)). 
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Note that for any choice of y > A; (l — \e), y — A;(l — e) is positive. Dividing 
the previous inequality on both sides by y — k(l — e) yields 
(2.5)
 y + fc(i_e) >*£+*. 
which is equivalent to (2.4). The inequality (2.5) can be shown to be true by 
noting that the left side is at least k ( l — |e)+A;(l —e) = 2k— | e = 2k—^ek, 
and for z G [0, A;], the right side is at most %A, resulting in 
, i 1 \ , , , bk + d 
k 1 - -e ) + k(l - e) > 2 ) y ' \a\ 
Since d < 0, this inequality is true i f l — | e + 1 — e > A . (i.e. | e < 2 — A ) . 
L e t £ = m i n { l , | ( 2 - ^ ) } . 
Thus each strategy y > k ( l — |g:) is strictly dominated by x = k(l — e) 
and a new subset »!?i = [0, k (l — \s)\ is created. Again, the value of k can 
be any positive real number, and this allows the procedure to be repeated. 
Therefore define Si i „ V 0,fc(l-|e Under this definition, as i —> oo, 
max{|x| : x G Si} —> 0. Thus Tk is strictly dominance solvable to 0. 
Case 2: a = 0, d < 0, b < 0. Consider 11(0, z) > Il(a;, z), which when 
expanded and simplified is equivalent to 0 > bxz + dx. This is true for 
any x G 5 where J ; / 0 , and so 0 strictly dominates all other strategies in 
S = [0, k], and F^ is solved in one step. 
To show necessity, assume that both cases given in the theorem fail and 0 
is a NE, but Tj, is SDS to 0 for all k. Let Si be the last subset to contain k 
as a strategy, and let w G Sjj+i be a strategy which dominates k with respect 
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to Sr. Therefore U(w,k) > H(k,k). Expanding this inequality, 
aw2 + bwk + ck2 + dw + ek + f > ak2 + bk2 + ck2 + dk + ek + f. 
From Theorem 2.10 a < 0 and d < 0. Consider when a < 0. Thus, 
| a | ( f c 2 -w 2 ) > (6fc + d)( fc-u; ) . 
It is clear that k — w > 0, and so, 
bk + d 
k + w> . . |a| 
Further, A; + w < 2k, and thus 
1 ., 6 d 
2 > -(fc + w) > r r + ^ . 
A; |a| k\a\ 
If A; is allowed to grow arbitrarily large, then the ^ r approaches 0 and so 
the contradiction 
b 
2
 > i-r > 2, |a| 
is reached. This shows that k cannot be strictly dominated. Therefore 
the strict-dominance reduction sequence cannot proceed past 51,. Hence Tk 
cannot be SDS to x = 0. 
If a = 0 then to be SDS to 0 as hypothesized, Lemma 2.11 proves that 
the payoff function II of T^ satisfies the second case of the theorem. • 
Now, with the results from Theorem 2.12 and those of Theorem 2.9, any 2 
player symmetric game with quadratic payoff functions on continuous strat-
egy spaces can be easily classified as either SDS or not SDS provided the 
game is being considered on a strategy space that can be of any size. 
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The two cases of Theorem 2.12 place restrictions on the values of a and d 
to ensure that Tk is SDS to 0 for any positive value k. If the value of k has a 
limit, however, then games which do not satisfy the conditions of Theorem 
2.12 may yet be strictly dominance solvable to 0 given a small enough value 
of k. When a specific value of k is used, it will be denoted by k and assumed 
to be positive. 
Corollary 2.13. Let T be a symmetric 2 player game with continuous payoff 
function U : [0,/c] x [0,/c] —> R for some fixed k > 0 where TL(x,y) = 
ax
2
 + bxy + cy2 + dx + ey + f with a < 0, d < 0, and b, c, e, and f are 
constants. Then Y is SDS to 0 if and only z/ 2 > A + ^A. 
Theorem 2.14. Let T be a symmetric 2 player game with continuous payoff 
function II : [0, k] x [0, k] —*• K where U(x, y) = ax2 + bxy + cy2 + dx + ey + f 
with d < 0, a = 0; b > 0, and c, e, and f are constants. Then T is SDS to 
0 if and only if 
d 
Proof. The proof that T is not strictly dominance solvable if k > 11| is 
provided above in the proof of Lemma 2.11, by following the line of reasoning 
there that assumes that there are strategies x,y E S such that U(x,z) > 
II(y, z) for any z G S. This inequality was shown to be equivalent to 
bz(x-y) > \d\(x-y), 
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and further, that for F to be SDS to 0 that x < y. Thus bz < \d\. Hence, if 
k > |f | , then 
<bz< \d\, 
Therefore k < | f\ 
Now consider 11(0, z) > H(x,z), which expands and simplifies to 0 > 
(bz + d)x. This is always true for z < |^ | and i / 0, and so T can be 
reduced to the single strategy 0 in one step if k < | ~ |. D 
Lemma 2.15. Suppose V is a symmetric 2 player game with continuous 
payoff function IT : [0,k] x [0, fc] —*• R where U(x,y) = ax2 + bxy + cy2 + dx + 
ey + f with a > 0, d < 0 and b, c, e, and, f constant. Then x = 0 is a NE 
if and only if k < | ~ |. 
Proof Assume that x = 0 is a NE. Thus 11(0, 0) > H(y, 0) which is equiva-
lent to 0 > y(ay + d). Since y > 0, it follows that ay + d < 0, or equivalently, 
ay < |d| for all y. The left side is maximized at y = k, and therefore, 
Conversely, if k < |^ | , then ay + d < 0 for all y G [0,fc] and so 0 is a 
NE. D 
Theorem 2.16. Let V be a symmetric 2 player gam,e with continuous payoff 
function H : [0, fc] x [0, k\ -^ E where Tl(x, y) = ax2 + bxy + cy2 + dx + ey + f 
with a > 0, d < 0, and k < |^ | , and where b, c, e, and f are constants. 
Then 
(1) if b > 0, then T is SDS to 0 if and only if (a + b)k_ < \d\. 
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(2) ifb<0, then T is SDS to 0 if and only if ak < \d\. 
Proof. (1) Assume that a > 0, b > 0, d < 0, k < \%\, and (a + b)k < 
\d\. Consider the inequality 11(0,2) — Yl(x,z) > 0. Expanded and 
simplified, this inequality is equivalent to 
(2.6) -x(ax + bz + d) > 0. 
Since (ax + bz + d) < 0 for all x, z <E S, (2.6) is true for all x E S 
where x ^ 0. Therefore all strategies x are strictly dominated and 
can be eliminated in one step, and thus F is SDS to 0. 
Now assume that (a + b)k > \d\ and that T is SDS to 0. Let Si be 
the last subset to contain k and let w £ Si+i be the strategy which 
strictly dominates k with respect to Si. Therefore U(w, z) — H(k, z) > 
0 for all z e Si. Expanding and simplifying this inequality yields 
a(w2 - k2) + (bz + d)(w - k) > 0. 
Dividing through by (w — k) < 0 then makes the inequality equivalent 
to 
a(w + k) + bz + d < 0. 
The left side is maximized when z = k, giving 
avj + (a + b)k + d < 0, 
a contradiction. Thus the strategy k can never be strictly dominated. 
Hence the strict domination reduction sequence cannot proceed past 
Si and thus T cannot be SDS to 0. 
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(2) Assume that a > 0, b < 0, d < 0, and k < \-\. In the same manner 
as the proof in part (1), consider the inequality 11(0, z) — II(a;, z) > 0. 
Expanded and simplified, this inequality is equivalent to 
7) —x(ax + bz + d) > —x(ax + d) > 0, 
which is true for all x E S, where x ^ 0. Therefore all strategies x 
are strictly dominated and can be eliminated in one step, and thus 
T is SDS to 0. 
The proof that V is not SDS to 0 if k > I -1 follows from the fact 
1
 — I a I 
that for such a k, Lemma 2.15 proves 0 is not a NE. Hence F cannot 
be SDS to 0. 
Now assume that F is SDS to 0 and k = l-l. Then Tl(x,y) = 
ax
2
 + bxy + cy2 — akx + ey + f. Let 5,: be the last subset to contain 
the strategy k and let w G Si+i be the strategy which strictly domi-
nates it with respect to Si. Consider U(w, 0) > H(k, 0), which when 
expanded and simplified, gives 
aw2 > ak2 
Dividing the left side by a > 0 makes the inequality equivalent to 
w2 > k2, 
a contradiction. Therefore k cannot be strictly dominated and so the 
strict-dominance reduction sequence cannot progress past Si. Thus 
T is not SDS to 0. 
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• 
The following corollary summarizes the results from Corollary 2.13 to 
Theorem 2.16 which require that k be limited to certain values. Note that the 
first case of the corollary is slightly relaxed from its counterpart in Theorem 
2.10. Also note that as in the case of interior NE, these conditions apply to 
the terms of the payoff function which depend on a player's own strategy 
and ignore those terms which only depend on the other player's. 
Corollary 2.17. Let T be a symmetric 2 player game with continuous payoff 
function U : [0,k] x [0,k] —> R for some fixed k > 0 where H(x,y) = 
ax
2
 + bxy + cy2 + dx + ey + / and a, b, c, d, e, and f are constants. Then 
T is SDS to 0 if and only if one of the following cases hold 
(1) a<0,d<0,and2>± + ^ . 
(2) a = 0, d < 0, and b < 0. 
(3) a = 0, d < 0, b > 0, andk<\f\. 
(4) a > 0, d< 0, 6 < 0 , and k < 1^1. 
\ / 7 — ; — ; — — | a | 
(5) a > 0, d < 0, 6 > 0, (a + b)k < \d\. 
The above results from Theorem 2.10 to Corollary 2.17 for games on 
strategy spaces of the type S = [0, k] can easily be shown for games on 
strategy spaces of the type S = [k, 0] with a minor change to the theorems. 
In each case replace the condition d < 0 with d > 0 and d < 0 with d > 0. 
This gives rise to the following theorem. 
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Theorem 2.18. Fix k,l > 0 and let Tkyl be a symmetric 2 player game 
with continuous payoff function II : [—/, k] x [—/, k] —> IR where U(x,y) = 
ax
2
 + bxy + cy2 + dx + ey + f and a, b, c, d, e, and f are constants. Then 
Fk>i restricted to [0, k] x [0, k] and to [—1, 0] x [—Z, 0] are both SDS to 0 if and 
only if a < 0, d = 0, and 2 > ~r. 
Proof. For Tfc>i to be SDS to 0 on both [0, k] and [—/, 0] for any k, I > 0 it 
must be true that d = 0. Since d = 0, the only case that applies is part (1) 
of Theorem 2.12. Therefore a < 0, d = 0 and 2 > ^ if Tkl is SDS to 0 for 
' \a\ " • ' ' 
both [—1, 0] and [0, Ar]. Conversely, if a < 0, d = 0 and 2 > A, then part (1) 
of Theorem 2.12 implies that Tktl is SDS to 0 for both [-1,0] and [0, k]. • 
This result is interesting because it is identical with the conditions for 
x — 0 to be a continuously stable strategy (CSS) for the symmetric game [6], 
as will be shown. 
Definition 2.19. A strategy x* E S is a CSS if the following conditions are 
satisfied. 
(1) U(x,x*) < U(x*,x*) for any x G S. 
(2) If Il(x,x*) = U(x*,x*) then Il(x,x) < Tl(x*,x) for any x <G S where 
X ^ X*. 
(3) There exists a e > 0 such that for any y G S with \y — x*\ < e 
there exists a 8 > 0 such that for all z G 5 with \y — z\ < S, 
Tl(z,y) > H(y, y) if and only if \z — x*\ < \y — x*\. 
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The first two conditions are known as the evolutionarily stable strategy 
(ESS) conditions [9], and a strategy that satisfies both of them is know as 
an ESS. The third condition, also known as convergent stability, ensures 
that if a strategy y is close to an ESS strategy x* then, for z close to y, z 
will perform better against y than y will against itself, if and only if z is 
closer to x* than y. 
Theorem 2.20. Let Tk,i be a symmetric 2 player game with continuous 
payoff function H : [—1, k] x [—•/, k] —> M. where U(x, y) = ax2 + bxy + cy2 + 
dx + ey + f and a, b, c, d, e, and f are constants. If T^/ restricted to 
[0, k) x [0, k) and to [-/, 0] x [-1, 0) are both SDS to 0 for any k, I > 0 then 
x* = 0 is a CSS, and conversely. 
Proof. By Theorem 2.18, a < 0. Thus II(x, x*) = ax2 < 0 = U(x\ x*) for all 
x E S. Furthermore, H(x,x*) < U(x*,x*) if x ^ x*, and so ESS conditions 
(1) and (2) are satisfied. 
Let x' € S be a strategy which is slightly closer than x to x* = 0, defined 
as x' = x + h(x* — x) where h > 0 and h = 0. Consider Yl(x', x) > II(x, x). 
Expanded, this inequality is 
(2.8) a ( ( l - h)x + hx*)2 + &((1 - h)x + hx*)x > ax2 + bx2. 
The hx* term can be omitted because x* — 0. Thus we have 
a ( l - hfx2 + 6(1 - h)x2 > ax2 + bx2. 
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Expanding this inequality gives 
a(h — 2)hx2 > bhx2, 
which is equivalent to (2.8) Divide both sides by hx2 > 0 and expand to 
reach 
ah + 2\a\ = ah — 2a > b. 
Thus, if 2\a\ > b, H(x', x) > Tl(x, x) for all x' close to x. By similar reasoning 
with h < 0, H(x', x) < Il(x, x) if x' is close to x but farther from x* than x. 
That is, if 2 > A, then x* — 0 satisfies (3), and thus, x* is a CSS. 
On the other hand, if 2 < A, then ah — 2a < b for all h > 0. Thus 
Tl(x', x) < Il(x, x) if x' is close to x and closer than x to x*. That is, x* is 
not a CSS • 
Theorems 2.18 and 2.20 provide further evidence that, for a game that 
satisfies their conditions, the prediction of rational behaviour provided by 
strict-dominance is an excellent choice. In addition to its already robust 
nature, due to it being a Nash equilibrium and a survivor of any strict-
dominance reduction sequence, it is also evolutionarily and continuously 
stable should the game be played more than once. 
2.1.3. The Snowdrift Game Revisited. The continuous Snowdrift game, as 
noted earlier, can be SDS, but this behaviour depends on the form of the 
cost and benefit functions B(x) and C(x). The strategy set can be defined 
as S = [0,1], where x = 0 implies no cooperation at all and x = 1 implies 
total cooperation. If these two functions are quadratic, that is that B(x) = 
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b2x2 + b\X and C(x) = c2x2 + c-^x, then Il(x, y) = B(x + y) — C(x) — 
(b2 — c2)x2 + 1b2xy + b2y2 + (bi — C\)x + bxy. Thus, to compare this function 
with the results of the previous section, note that a = (b2 — c2), b = 2b2, 
c = b2, d = (61 — ci), e — bi and / = 0. Therefore, by Theorem 2.12, it is 
clear that the game will be SDS to 0 if either 
(1) b2 < c2, 61 < ci, and \b2 - c2\ > b2 or 
(2) b2 = c2, h < ci, and b2 < 0. 
is true. 
Thus example (d) of the continuous SD game in [4] can be shown to be 
SDS to 0 as well as being evolutionarily and dynamically stable. In the 
example, b2 = —1.5, b\ = 7, c2 = —1 and c\ = 8, which satisfy the first of 
the above conditions. 
Example (e) from the same text shows that by simply changing one of 
the linear values, namely from c\ = 8 to c\ = 2 results not only in the game 
being evolutionarily stable to the opposite endpoint, but also removes the 
quality of strict-dominance solvability from the game. 
Example (b), which represents an interior ESS [4] at x = 0.6, is also 
strict dominance solvable to x = 0.6 when considered on the strategy spaces 
[0,0.6] and [0.6,1]. This can be seen by taking the original payoff function 
with values b2 — —1.5, 61 = 7, c2 = —1 and c\ = 4.6 resulting in U(x,y) = 
—0.5x2 — 3xy — 1.5y2 + 2Ax + 7y and then translating the coordinates by 
x = x + 0.6 and y = y + 0.6 to create the function Yl(x,y) = —0.5(x + 
0.6)2 - 3(f + 0.6)(£ + 0.6) - 1.5(£ + 0.6)2 + 2.4(x + 0.6) + 7(y + 0.6) = 
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-O.bx2 - 3xy - l.by2 + 3Ay + 3.84 that has a NE at x = 0. With values 
a = —0.5, b = — 3 and d = 0, it then becomes clear that Theorem 2.18 is 
satisfied, and so by Theorem 2.20, x = 0 is a CSS. 
2.1.4. A Game Solved in a Finite Number of Steps. A closer look at the 
proofs in this thesis for when V is SDS to 0 on a compact interval reveals 
that the games are solved in either one step or in a countably infinite number 
of steps. 
From the above results, it may appear that games are only solvable in 
either one step or in a countably infinite number of steps. Below is an 
example of a symmetric game which is strict-dominance solvable in five 
steps. 
Example 2.21. Let T be the symmetric game on S = [—1,2] with payoff 
function II : S x S —> R defined by 
U(x,y) 
-x
2
 xe[-l,l],ye[-l,2}. 
-\x2 ~ \{x - l)y - I xe{l,2],ye[-l,2]. 
Note that Il(x, y) is continuous in (x, y). Initially, this game can be reduced 
in the manner outlined in Theorem 2.9 with e = | . Thus at each iteration 
Sz = (-l,k{l - IY) = (-1,2(1)*). After the third iteration, the strategy 
space is S3 — (—1, Y§§). NOW consider 11(1, z) > TL(y, z) for all z with y > 1 
and y, z E S3. The inequality 11(1, z) > U(y, z) is equivalent to 
1
 9 \, , 2 
•^V-2^-^-3 
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which simplifies to 
-\(1-I?)>\z(l-V)-
When both sides are divided by 1 — y < 0, 11(1, z) > H(y, z) is shown to be 
equivalent to 
I,
 N 1 
- 3 U + I/) < 2* 
Since y > 1 is required, the left side of the last inequality must be less than 
—1(1 + 1) = — | . Minimize the right hand side by substituting z = — ^ jf-
Thus, 
2 125 
~ 3 < 216' 
and therefore the strategy x = 1 strictly dominates any such strategy y G S3, 
and 5*4 = [—1,1] is found. In this fourth subset, notice that 11(0, z) > U(x, z) 
for all x,z E S4 and so the strategy space is reduced to 0 in one further step. 
2.2. Higher Order Payoff Functions in Symmetr ic Games . Even in 
the well behaved and simplified case of symmetric games with one-dimensional 
strategy spaces, the introduction of cubic or higher order terms quickly adds 
complications. 
2.2.1. Interior Symmetric NE. Similar to the above section on interior sym-
metric NE, this section assumes that the strategy set S is of the form 
S = [—/, k] for some /, k > 0 and that the NE is x* = 0. 
Theorem 2.22. Fix k,l > 0. Let Tkj be a symmetric 2 player game with 
continuous payoff function II : S x S —> M given by H(x,y) = ax2 + bxy + 
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cy2 + dx + ey + f + gx3, + hx2y + ixy2 + j y 3 where a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i 
and j are constants, and S = [—1, k) for any k, I > 0. Then: 
(1) x* = 0 is a NE for all Tkj if and only if d = g = 0 and a < 0. 
(2) If k,l > 0 are fixed and a = d = g = 0, then there are no x,y G 5* 
such that x strictly dominates y in Yk,i • 
Thus if T^i is SDS to x* = 0 for all k, I, then the NE is x = 0, d = g = 0, 
and a < 0. 
Proof (1) Assume that x = 0 is a NE, and thus 11(0, 0) > U(x, 0). This 
inequality is equivalent to 
(2.9) 0 > x(ax + d + gx2). 
For small values of \x\, if d ^ 0, the d term dominates the other 
terms in (2.9), and the only value which guarantees that 0 > dx is 
d — 0. Assuming d = 0 transforms (2.9) to 
(2.10) 0>x2(a + gx), 
where now for small values of |x-|, if a ^ 0, the a term dominates the 
g term. Tims to guarantee 0 > ax2 it follows that a < 0. However, 
for large values of |x|, the g term dominates the a term in (2.10), 
and so if g ^ 0 there is no value of g which can guarantee that 
0 > x2(a + gx). Therefore g = 0. 
Now assume that a < 0 and d = g = 0, and examine 11(0, 0) > 
U(x,0). This inequality is equivalent to 0 > ax2 which is true for 
any x G S. Therefore, x = 0 is a NE. 
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(2) Assume that a = d = g = 0, and that there exists some x,y G S 
such that II(x, z) > U(y, z) for all z €E 5 . This inequality expands to 
bxz + cz2 + ez + f + +hx2z + ixz2+jz3 > byz + cz2jrez + f + hy2z + iyz2+jz3 
and simplifies to 
bxz + hx2z + ixz2 > byz + /w/2z + iyz2. 
Substituting z = 0 into this inequality yields 0 > 0, an obvious 
contradiction. 
The remainder of the proof follows from Corollary 2.7. • 
T h e o r e m 2 .23 . Fix k, I > 0. Let T ^ be a symmetric 2 player game with 
continuous payoff' function U : S x S —> R piven 6y Il(x, y) = ax2 + fccy + 
cy2 + dx + ey + f + gx3 + hx2y + ixy2 + j y 3 where a, 6, c, d, e, / , g, /i, i and j 
are constants and S — [—1, k]. If a < 0, d = g = 0, and |^ | < 2 i/ien I \ / is 
/SJDIS' to 0 i / i and k are both positive and sufficiently close to 0. 
Proof. Assume that |^ | < 2, a < 0 and d = g = 0. Thus by the above 
Theorem, x = 0 is a NE. Without loss of generality, assume that k > I. 
Define S = So.o and let y > k — \ek, where 1 > e > 0 will be chosen later. 
Examine the inequality II(fc(l — e), z) > Tl(y, z). for this to be true for every 
y, z 6 S, it follows that 
(2.11) 
a(k(l~e))2 + bk(l-e)z + h(k(l-e))2z + ik(l-e)z2 > ay2 + byz + hy2z+iyz2, 
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or equivalently, 
(2.12) y2 - (Ml - e)f > ^ T ^ - *(1 - e)). 
\a\ ii^ 
It is true that y — k(\ — e) > 0, so if both sides of the above inequality are 
divided by a factor of y — k(l — e), (2.12) becomes 
(2.13) y + k{l-e)> —?—-. 
\a\ — nz 
If the values of / and k are small enough so that b is the dominant term in 
the numerator of the fraction in 2.13 and \a\ is the dominant term in the 
denominator, this can be rewritten as 
b 
y + k(l - e) > -r-.z. 
\a\ 
The remainder of the proof then follows exactly that of Theorem 2.9 starting 
at inequality (2.3). • 
Theorem 2.24. Let T^i be a symmetric 2 player game with continuous 
payoff function TL : S x S —>• IR given by U(x,y) = ax2 + bxy + cy2 + dx + 
ey +f + gx3 + hx2y + ixy2+jy3 where a,b,c,d,e, f,g,h,i and j are constants 
and S = [—/, k] for any k, I > 0. / / |^ | > 2, then T^j is not SDS to 0. 
Proof. Choose 0 < k < min(fc, /) where k is small and to be determined 
below. Assume that I \ z is SDS to 0, and so, that 0 is a NE. Thus by 
Theorem 2.22, d = g = 0, and a < 0. Let I > k, and Si be a reduction 
sequence for x* = 0. Let Sj be the last subset that contains both k and —k. 
For Tk>i to be SDS to 0, it must be true that there is a strategy w G Si+i 
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which strictly dominates one of the strategies k or — k with respect to Si. 
Assume it is k. Therefore U(w, z) > Tl(k, z) for all z G Sj. Let z — 0. The 
inequality then expands and simplifies to 
aw2 > ak2, 
and dividing both sides by a then gives 
w2 < P. 
Therefore, \w\ < k. 
It also follows that Tl(w,k) > H(k,k). Expanding and simplifying this 
inequality shows 
aw2 + bwk + hw2k + iwk2 > ak2 + bk2 + hk3 + ik3. 
This inequality is equivalent to 
(a + hk)(w2 - k2) > (bk + ik2)(k - w). 
Note that k — w > 0, and so dividing both sides of the inequality gives 
(\a\ - hk)(k + w) > bk + ik2 
Given small enough k it is true that \a\ — hk > 0, and thus dividing both 
sides of the previous inequality by that value gives 
- bk + ik2 
k + w > 
\a\ — hk 
It is clear that 2k > k + w and so 
2k > 
\a\ — hk 
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or, by dividing through by k, 
b + ik 
2 > - . 
\a\ — hk 
Since linif
 n -^vr — A , when k is sufficiently small, it must be that 2 > A 
fe
^
u
 \a\-hk H ' J ) — | a | 
for w to strictly dominate such a A;. Similarly, to eliminate A; as a strictly 
dominated strategy it must be that U(w, —k) > U(k, —k) and from this 
inequality that 2 > T4 for sufficiently small k. The same inequalities must 
hold if —A; is to be eliminated for sufficiently small k. Therefore the strict 
dominance reduction sequence cannot proceed past Si and thus I \ | is not 
SDS to 0. • 
Corollary 2.25. Let Ykil be a symmetric 2 player game with continuous 
•payoff function H : S x S —* R where the coefficient of the x2 term is a and 
the coefficient of the xy term is b where a and b are constants and S = [—1, k] 
for any k, I > 0. If a ^ 0 and \-\ > 2 then Tkj is not SDS to 0. On the other 
hand, if a ^ 0 and |^ | < 2, then T^t is SDS to 0 if k, I > 0 are sufficiently 
small. 
The proof of the corollary follows the same structure as the above proofs, 
relying on the fact that all terms besides those involving a and b will disap-
pear for small values of k. 
The results in this section on higher order payoff functions in relation 
to quadratic payoff functions in Section 2.1 when 0 is in the interior of S 
can be summarized in this fashion. By Corollary 2.25, the strict-dominance 
solvability of i \ / to 0 for small k,l > 0 is characterized through the quadratic 
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terms of the payoff functions except in the threshold cases a — 0 or - = 2. 
That is, by restricting the strategy space to be near 0, higher order terms 
can be ignored when examining strict-dominance solvability to 0 (except in 
threshold cases). 
2.3. Symmetr ic Games wi th Higher Dimensional Strategy Spaces. 
All of the games which have been considered thus far have had one dimen-
sional strategy spaces for each player. In fact, it is the same strategy space 
for each player since the games considered have been symmetric. This is 
another restriction which can be relaxed to examine when a broader class 
of games is strict-dominance solvable. As always, the first consideration is 
to see when games of this class have a Nash equilibrium. In the discussion 
below, note that a; is a column vector and D and E are row vectors and so 
expressions such as Dx are the inner product of those two vectors. 
Theorem 2.26. Let T be a symmetric 2 player game with continuous payoff 
function II : S x S —>• 1R given by TL(x, y) = xTAx+xTBy+yTCy+Dx+Ey+ 
F where S is an n dimensional strategy space which has 0 in the interior 
and where A, B, and C are constant n x n matrices, D and E are constant 
n-dimensional vectors, and F is a constant. The vector 0 is a NE if and 
only if A is negative semi-definite and D = 0. Further, ifT is SDS to 0 then 
A is negative definite. 
Proof Assume that 0 is a NE. Thus 11(0,0) > U(x,Q) for any x E S. This 
inequality, when expanded and simplified is equivalent to 0 > xTAx + Dx. 
For small values of x the Dx term dominates the right side of the inequality, 
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and the only value of D which guarantees 0 > Dx is D — 0. Therefore, 
the inequality becomes 0 > xTAx for all x G S. Since 0 is in the interior of 
S, this implies 0 > xTAx for all i r e l " , which is the definition of A being 
a negative semi-definite matrix. The remainder of the proof follows from 
Theorem 2.5, which states that if T is SDS to 0 then it must be a SNE, and 
thus that 0 > xTAx for all x / 0 , hence A is a negative definite matrix. • 
The addition of other dimensions to the strategy space quickly compounds 
the difficulty in finding clear conditions for a game to be SDS. The following 
two examples show that the class of games with A negative definite and 
D = 0 contain examples that are SDS to 0 and others that are not SDS to 
0 depending on the matrix B. 
E x a m p l e 2 .27. Let T be the 2 player symmetric game with strategy space 
5 x 5 where S — {(x,y)\x2 + y2 < 1} and symmetric payoff functions 
Il((x, y), (x, y)) = (x, y)TA(x, y) + (x, y)TB(x, y) where A = — I and B = I. 
Then T is SDS to 0 = (0,0). 
Proof. Let xf} + y2 = 1. Then Il((l - e)(x0,y0),{x,y)) -Jl((xo,y0),(x,y)) is 
equivalent to 
- ( 1 - e)2(xl + yl) + (1 - e)(xx0 + yyQ) - [x20 + yl + xx0 + yy0] 
which simplifies to 
( 2 e - e 2 ) -e(x,y) • (x0,y0) 
Therefore LI((1 - e){xQ,y0), (x, y)) - U((x0,y0), {x,y)) > £ - £ 2 > 0 i f 0 < 
e < 1 since (x,y) • (x0,y0) < \\(x, y)\\\\{x0, y0)\\ = \Jx2 + y2 < 1. Thus all 
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(x, y) near the boundary of S can be eliminated in one step to form a new 
S\ = {(x,y)\x2 + y2 < r} for some 0 < r < 1. By iterating this procedure 
a reduction sequence is formed, with Sn = {(x,y)\x2 + y2 < rn} and so 
rr=iSn = {(o,o)}. • 
The above clearly shows that some games with higher dimensional strat-
egy spaces are SDS. This is not always the case, even if A is negative definite 
and D = 0, as the following counterexample shows. 
Example 2.28. Let V be the 2 player symmetric game with strategy space 
S x S where S = {(x,y)\x2 + y2 < 1} and symmetric payoff functions 
U((x,y), (x,y)) — (x,y)TA(x1y) + (x7y)TB(x,y) where A = — I and B = 21. 
Then T is not SDS to 0. 
Proof. Suppose that x\ + y\ = 1. For Y to be SDS the strategy (xQ,y0) 
must be strictly dominated in some subset of S. Therefore assume that 
there exists a (x, y) E Si+\ such that H((x, y), (x, y)) > n ( (x 0 , yo), (x, y)) for 
all (x,y) E Sz. It follows then that Il((x,y), {x0,y0)) > U((x0,y0), {x0,y0)). 
Expanding and simplifying this inequality shows 
-(x2 + y2) + 2{x,y)-(x0,y0) > 1. 
Recall that (x,y) • (x0,yQ) < \\(x,y)\\\\(x0,y0)\\ = y?x2 + y2. thus, ~(x2 + 
y2) + 2 ( x , y ) - ( x 0 , i / o ) < - ( x 2 + ?/2) + 2 v / x 2 + t/2 = v / x 2 + y 2 ( 2 - v / x 2 + y2). 
Since ^/x2 + y2(2-^/x2 + y2) < l f o r a l l 0 < ^x2 + y2 < l,U((x,y),(x0,y0)) < 
n((xo,yo), (xo,yo)) for all (x,y) G S. That is, no such (x0,y0) can be elimi-
nated as a strictly dominated strategy and so T is not SDS to 0. • 
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It is then clear that there must be some restrictions on a game of this class 
which apply to the values of A and B in the payoff functions. The exact 
requirement may be a strict inequality that generalizes the scalar inequality 
HI < 2 to one involving matrices A and B, or may have requirements at a 
boundary which cannot be easily classified. This avenue of research warrants 
further investigation. 
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3. Asymmetric Games 
Until now, all of the games considered have been symmetric. The follow-
ing sections will deal with two-player games which have asymmetric payoff 
functions. A two-player asymmetric game P is defined by pure strategy sets 
S and T for Players 1 and 2 respectively, with payoff function Hi : S x T —> R 
for Player f and II2 : S x T —>• R for Player 2. Similarly to a symmetric 
game, in a two-player asymmetric game a strategy pair x G S strictly dom-
inates a strategy x G S with respect to S if and only if Hi(x, z) > IIi(£, z) 
for all z G T, and a strategy y G T strictly dominates a strategy y G T with 
respect to T if and only if n2(u>, y) > n2(u>, y) for all w £ S. 
Definition 3.1 . An asymmetric two-player game T, with payoff functions Hi 
and n 2 and pure strategy sets S and T is strict-dominance solvable (SDS) to 
the strategy pair (x*, y*) if there is a finite or countable number of subsets of 
SxT, SxT = U0 D Ui = Si xTi D U2 = S2xT2 D ... D Uz = Sz xT, D . . . , 
called a reduction sequence for (x*,y*), such that 
(f) Ui+i is a proper subset of Ui. 
(2) for every x G Si \ S1+i there is a x G Si+i such that x strictly 
dominates x with respect to Si and for every y G Tj \ T i + 1 there is a 
y G Ti+i such that y strictly dominates y with respect to Tj. 
(3) fWi = {(**.!/*)}• 
Example 3.2. Consider the game in Example 1.5. By the above definition, 
it is SDS to {(1,3)} with UQ = {(1, 2,3) x (1,2,3)}, Ux = {(1,3) x (1, 2,3)}, 
[/2 = { ( l , 3 ) x ( 3 ) } , a n d C / 3 = { ( l ) x ( 3 ) } . 
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Definition 3.3. A strategy pair (x,y) G S x T is called a Nash equilibrium 
(NE) if TLi(x,y) > Ui(x,y) for all x £ S and U2(x,y) > U2(x,y) for all 
y G T. If both of the previous inequalities are strict where x ^ x and y ^ y, 
the strategy pair (x,y) is called a stnct /Vas/i equilibrium (SNE). 
Theorem 3.4. Let T be an asymmetric game that is SDS to a NE (x, y) G 
S xT. Then (x, y) is a SNE. 
Proof. Assume that (x, y) is not a SNE. Hence there exists some (x, y) G 
5 x T w i t h (x,y) ^ (x, y) such that Tli(x, y) > Ui(x,y) or some (x,y) G SxT 
with (x, y) ^ (x, y) such that n 2 (x , y) > n 2 (x , y). Without loss of generality, 
assume that (x,y) G S x T exists. Let Ui be the last subset in a reduction 
sequence for (x, y) such that (x, y) is a member. Therefore there exists a 
(x*,y) G Ui+i such that Ui(x*,y) > Iii(x,y) > Hi(x,y). This contradicts 
the assumption that (x, y) is a NE. • 
Moulin's result states that if T is SDS to x then £ is a NE holds regardless 
of whether T is symmetric or asymmetric, so long as every 11,; is continuous 
and S and T are compact. Thus the above theorem can then be read: Let 
T be an asymmetric game that is SDS to (x, y) G S x T. Then (x, y) is a 
SNE. 
Theorem 3.5. IfT is SDS to (x*,y*) and (x, y) is a NE ofT then (x*, y*) — 
(x,y). 
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Proof. Assume that (x*,y*) ^ (x,y). Thus there must be some stage k 
in which (x,y) is strictly dominated. Therefore for some (x,y) € U/. ei-
ther Ui(x,y) > Hi(x,y) or H2(x,y) > n 2 (x ,y ) , which both contradict the 
assumption that (x, y) is a NE. • 
Corollary 3.6. / / (x,y) is a NE of T and T is SDS to (x,y), then (x,y) 
is a member of every subset in any strict-dominance solvability reduction 
sequence ofT. 
In summary, these three results show that the general theory of strict-
dominance solvability for symmetric games at the beginning of Section 2 
extends to two-player asymmetric games. The following section extends 
Section 2.1 to two player asymmetric games, first showing what conditions 
need be met for a game to have interior or boundary NE, and then conditions 
for SDS. 
3.1. A s y m m e t r i c Games W i t h Quadratic Payoff Functions and One 
Dimensional Strategy Spaces. This section will completely characterize 
what is necessary and sufficient for an asymmetric game Y with compact 
strategy sets S and T and quadratic payoff functions IT and Tl2 to be SDS 
to a strategy pair (x,y). Such games are guaranteed to have at least one 
mixed strategy NE [3]. 
3.1.1. Interior NE. 
Theorem 3.7. Suppose T^^^M ^s a 9am^ with payoff functions Hi : S x 
T —> M. anc/n2 : SxT —> K given byHi(x, y) = ajX2'•+bixy+ciy'2',+dix+eiy+fi 
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where at, bi, Ci, di; e?;, and fa are constants, and S = [—h,ki] and T = 
[—1.2, ^2] for some ki,k2,li,l2 > 0. The following then hold: 
(1) / / (x, y) = (0,0) is a NE, then d1 = 0 and e2 = 0. 
(2) If (x, y) = (0, 0) is a NE, then aa < 0 and c2 < 0. 
(3) If a,\ = d\ = 0, t/ien ^/iere are no x, x £ S such that x strictly 
dominates x. Similarly, if c2 = e2 = 0, then there are no y,y E T 
such that y strictly dominates y. 
Thus when considering games with quadratic payoffs on compact interval 
strategy spaces that are strictly dominance solvable to (x, y) = (0, 0) in S x 
T = [—li, ki] x [—/2, ^2] it can be assumed that d\ = e2 = 0 and both a\ and 
c2 are negative. 
Proof (1) Assume (0,0) is a NE and so ^ ( 0 , 0 ) > ^ ( ^ O ) . Thus 0 > 
x{a\X + d\). If d\ 7^  0, then for small values of \x\ the d\ term 
dominates the a,\ term, and 0 > d\x is only guaranteed for d\ = 0. 
Similarly, if (0,0) is a NE then n 2 (0 ,0) > n 2 (0 ,y ) , and so 0 > 
J/(c2y + e2), and accordingly e2 = 0. 
(2) Assume (0, 0) is a NE. Again this means that 0 > x{a\X + di), or by 
the above 0 > a^x1. Therefore a± < 0. A parallel argument shows 
c 2 < 0 . 
(3) Assume a\ = d\ — 0 and that there are strictly dominated strategies 
in S. Thus there exist some x,x E S such that Ui(x,y) > Hi(x,y) 
for all y E T. Expanded and simplified, this means that bxy > bxy, 
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which is impossible at y = 0. A similar contradiction can be reached 
for c2 = e2 = 0. 
• 
Theorem 3.8. Fix ki,k2,li,l2 > 0. Let Tkltiuk2,i2 be a game with payoff 
functions Ii\ : S x T —» E and n 2 : S x T —* R <yroen &y Il,;(a:,?/) = 
diX2 + bi'xy + fyy2 + (fa; + eiy + fa where ai, h%, Ci, di7 ei} and f are constants, 
and S = [—li, kf\ and T = [—/2, k2). Then ^ki,h,k2,h ^s $DS to (x, y) = (0, 0) 
and (0, 0) is a NE if and only if a,\ < 0, c2 < 0, d\ = e2 = 0, and 
h 
c2 
Proof. To show that (3.1) combined with ai,c2 < 0 and d\ = e2 = 0 are 
sufficient for Tkuik2 to be SDS to 0, assume that all of those conditions 
hold. Let x > ki — ^ e-^ki, where e\ > 0 will be chosen later. Consider 
ni(fci(l — £i), y) > rii(£, y), that, if true for all « /eT , would mean that all 
of Player l's strategies x > x are strictly dominated and may be eliminated. 
For this inequality to be true, 
(3.2) ai(ki(l - ei))2 + &i/ci(l - Si)y > axx2 + bxxy. 
This can be rearranged and simplified to 
x + /ci(l -€i) > -r^-y. 
I a i | 
Minimize the left hand side by substituting x = k\ — \e\ki. For y <E [—l2, k2] 
the right hand side of the last inequality is maximized by either y — —12 if 
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(3.1) 4 > 
&i < 0 and y = k2 if bi >Q. Hence (3.2) is equivalent to either 
if bx < 0 or 
h f 1 - -eij +fc!(l-ei)> 
fci ( 1 - o ^ i ) + ^ i ( 1 - £ i ) > 
61 
if 61 > 0, that can be rearranged to 
2 - ? 1 > fci 
and 
2 - - £ l > 
2 ai 
^2 
fcl' 
respectively. Similar conditions arise when considering IIi(—/i(l — Ei), y) > 
Tii(x',y) with x' < ~k + \e\h, n2(x, k2(l - £2) > n2(.x,y) with y > k2 -
|e2A:2, and n 2 ( - / 2 ( l - e2), y) > n2(x, ?/) with y' < -l2 + \s2l2. 
The remainder of the proof follows the case when b\ > 0 and b2 < 0. The 
other cases follow a similar argument. Let x' < —l\ + \e\l\, y > k2 — ^£2k2, 
and y' < -l2 + \e2l2-
In this case, if 
(3.3) 
then all strategies x > x can be eliminated as strictly dominated strategies. 
Similarly, if 
2 -
3 
" 7^1 > 
2 
61 
OL\ 
k2 
h 
(3.4) 2 -
3 
- o £ l > 
2 
&i 
Ol 
*2 
*1 
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then all strategies x < x' can be eliminated, if 
2 -
3 
- -e2 > 2 
b2 
c2 
h 
k2 
(3.5) 
then all strategies y > y can be eliminated, and if 
(3.6) 2 - -e 2 > 
2 /2 
then all strategies y < y' can be eliminated. 
Consider the case k\ > l\, l2 > &2- If this is true, then for sufficiently 
small values of e\ and e2 either (3.3) or (3.5) is true since, by (3.1) 
>-h 2- -e2 2 9 4 - 3 ( e i + e2) + j£ie2 
> 
> 
b\b2 
axc2 
b\k2 
3(ei + e 2 ) + - e i e 2 
aih 
M i 
c2k2 
3 ( e i + £ 2 ) + T&I£ 2 
and so, strategies x > x or y > y can be eliminated as strictly dominated 
strategies. Continue this process using (3.3) or (3.5) until either k\ = l\ and 
h > k2 or k\ > l\ and l2 = k2. Without loss of generality, assume that the 
stage reached is that of fci = l\ and l2 > k2. 
then NOW, if £ > yj b\C2 
hh 
c2h 
< 
b\c2 
b2(ii 
616: 1"2 
a\C2 
< 2 , 
and therefore (3.6) holds and strategies y < y' can be eliminated as strictly 
dominated strategies by using a sufficiently small e2. This decreases ^- ^ 
l2 < k2 at any stage, then l2 can be kept equal to k2 thereafter by eliminating 
y < y' and y > y. 
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If on the other hand ~ < &2Q1 
blC-2 
then 
b\k2 
o,\k\ < 
hk 
a,\l\ 
< 
b2ax 
b\C2 
bxb2 
«ic 2 
< 2 , 
and thus (3.3) and (3.4) hold and strategies x > x and x < x' can be 
eliminated, keeping the new interval symmetric about 0. This increases ^ 
since k\ = l\ decreases. Eventually a stage will be reached where ^- — 
l2 — k2 and l\ = k\. Thereafter, all four inequalities (3.3), (3.4), b-iai blC2 
(3.5) and (3.6) hold and all strategies x > x, x < x', y > y and y < y' 
. The b2ai b\C2 can be eliminated simultaneously in such a way to keep y = 
intersection of these rectangles is {(0,0)} and thus rfcl];ljfc2;2 is SDS to (0, 0). 
A comparable situation arises if any assumptions about b\, b2, or the 
relative lengths of li, k%, l2, or k2 are changed. 
Assume Tkuiuk2,h is SDS to 0 and 0 is a NE. Then a\ < 0, c2 < 0, and 
di = 0 = e2 by Theorem 3.7. Assume that (3.1) fails, but rfcl];ifc2 is SDS 
to (0,0). Pick 0 < k < min{/i, &i} and 0 < / < min{Z2,/c2} such that 
and let Si x Tt be the last subset of S x T to contain the 
strategies ±k and ±1. To eliminate Player l 's strategy k it must be true that 
Tlx(w,l) > Ui(k,l) for some w e Si+\. If Il1(it;, 0) > IIi(A:,0) is considered 
it is clear to see that once expanded and simplified, that inequality becomes 
a\w2 > a\k2. Since a\ < 0, the previous inequality becomes w2 < k2, or 
more simply, that \w\ < \k\. 
It must also be true that Hi(io,l) > JJi(k,l). When this inequality is 
expanded and simplified it is equivalent to 
k + w > -—-I. 
If both sides are divided by k, then it is clear that 
2 > -(k + w) > - ^ y - . 
k \CL\\ k 
Substituting the given value of I into the right side of above inequality gives 
2 > -(k + w) > (*) 
k 
where (*) is the sign of b\. This inequality is equivalent to 
2 > -(k + w) > (*)H 
k 
and so 61 must be negative. 
However, to eliminate the strategy k, it must also be true that Hi(w, —I) > 
H\(k, —I). This inequality, expanded and simplified, yields 
7 u i 1 
k + w > — -—-/. 
The same method as in the above paragraph the shows that 
2 > -(k + w) > -(*)< 
k 
and so by must be positive. Therefore it is impossible to eliminate the 
strategy k while Player 2 can still play strategies I and —I. 
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Parallel arguments show that it is impossible to eliminate —k before I 
and —/, as well as it being impossible to eliminate I or —/ before k and —k. 
Therefore TkuLk2 is not SDS to (0,0). • 
Just as in the case of Theorem 2.9, this result provides a characterization 
of which quadratic games are SDS to an interior NE. In fact, the restrictions 
in the above theorem are exactly the same as those in Theorem 2.9 when 
applied to a symmetric game where at = c^ = a and b\ — 62 = b. 
Theorem 3.8 shows there is a clear line between games that satisfy the 
conditions of the theorem and those with interior Nash equilibria that do not. 
In [8], Moulin also provides a definite condition that must be satisfied for a 
continuous and compact game to be SDS, and the result of the above theorem 
coincides with that of Moulin, but extends past his result in the fact that it 
considers the game on any strategy space S x T and gives both sufficient and 
necessary condition for a game to be SDS to 0, whereas Moulin's theorem 
only provides a sufficient condition for "local" games (i.e. k, I close to 0). 
Moulin's theorem, however, does take into account a wider class of games, 
those with non-quadratic payoff functions. The fact that Moulin's theorem 
is true for such a large group of games accounts for its inability to show 
necessity when applied in a narrower view. 
3.1.2. Boundary NE. Similar to the section on quadratic functions in sym-
metric games, games where the NE is on the boundary of one of the strategy 
sets will now be considered. 
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Theorem 3.9. Fix k\, I, k2 > 0. Let Tkui,k2 be a gam,e with payoff functions 
III • S x T —> R and I l2 : S x T —> M. yw/en &y IT (re, y) = a ^ 2 + 6,;a:y + Qy2 + 
dja; + e,y + /j where a{, bi} Ci, d%, ei} and f are constants, and S — [0, k{\ 
and T = [—/, k2] for any k\, k2,1 > 0. The following are then true: 
(1) If (0, 0) is a NE of TkulM for all kul, k2 > 0 , then ax < 0, dx < 0, 
e2 < 0 and e2 — 0. 
(2) / / ax = d\ — 0, iften for every I, k2 > 0, there exists a k\ > 0 suc/i 
£/iat no strategy in S is strictly dominated. Similarly, if c2 = e2 = 0, 
£/ien i/iere are no y,y G T suc/z. t/iai y strictly dominates y. 
Therefore, ifTkliijk2 ^s SD$ t° (0,0) for all k\ > 0, then a,\ < 0, d\ < 0, 
c2 < 0 and e2 = 0, but a\ = 0 and d\ = 0 cannot both be true. 
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows exactly Theorems 2.8 and 2.10 
applied to T and S, respectively. • 
Analogously to Theorem 2.10, these conditions only hold when k\ is al-
lowed initially to have any positive value. Given a limit on the size of £4, 
neither is necessarily true. We continue to assume in the following two re-
sults that k\ is allowed to have any positive value. The following result is 
the analogue of Lemma 2.11. 
Theorem 3.10. Fix k\, I, k2 > 0. Let Tkl ^k2 be a game with payoff functions 
rii : S x T —> R and U2 : S x T —• R given by IT (x,y) = atx2 + bi:xy + Qy2 + 
diX + e«y + f where a,\ = 0, c2 < 0, d\ < 0, e2 ~ 0, a2, bl; C\, d2, e\, and 
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fi are constants, and S = [0, k\] and T = [—/, k2] for any k\, k2,1 > 0. Then 
^ki,i,k2 is SDS to (0,0) for all choices ofk\, k2, I > 0 if and only ifb^b2 < 0. 
Proof. The proof of the sufficient conditions for strict-dominance solvability 
will be divided into two cases, where it is shown that r ^ ^ is SDS in each 
case. 
Case 1: ai = 0, c2 < 0, d\ < 0, e2 = 0, b\ > 0 and b2 < 0. The inequality 
n 2 (x , 0) — n2(a;, y) > 0 is equivalent to 0 > c2y2 + b2xy, which is true for all 
y G T where y > 0. Any strategy y G T where y > 0 is therefore strictly 
dominated by 0 and can be eliminated, reducing T to Tx = [—/, 0] is one 
step. The resulting strategy space is Si x 7\ = [0, ki] x [—/, 0]. 
Now consider ITi(0, y) — Tli(x, y) > 0 which is equivalent to 0 > bixy + d^x 
and is always true for x G S where i / 0 since 6 i > 0 , y < 0 , x > 0 and 
di < 0. Therefore any strategy x G S where x ^ 0 is strictly dominated 
and can be eliminated, reducing Si to S2 = {0} in one step, resulting in the 
strategy space S2 x T2 = {0} x [—/,0]. 
Finally consider IT2(0,0) — il2(0,y) > 0. This inequality is equivalent to 
0 > c2y2 which is true for all y G T2 where y ^ 0. Any strategy y G T2 
where y ^ 0 is therefore strictly dominated and can be eliminated. 
Thus Tklti,k2 is SDS to (0,0) in three steps. 
Case 2: a\ — 0, c2 < 0, d\ < 0, e2 = 0, b\ < 0 and 62 > 0. This case 
follows a similar argument to the above case, however, in the first step any 
strategy y G T where y < 0 is eliminated, followed by the elimination of 
any strategy x G Si where x ^ 0, and finishing with the elimination of the 
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remaining strategies y E T2 where y > 0. Again rfcl;ife2 is SDS to (0,0) in 
three steps. 
Conversely, assume that Tklti,k2 is SDS to (0,0) and that a\ = 0, d\ < 0, 
c2 < 0 and e2 = 0, but that b\b2 > 0. This portion of the proof will also 
have two cases. Both reach a contradiction which shows that T ^ ^ W11l n ° t 
be SDS to (0,0) if 6162 > 0. 
Case 1: b1, b2 > 0. Let Si x % be the last subset of S x T such that S C Si 
and k-2,0 E Tt. For a strategy £ G Sl+i to strictly dominate a strategy x E Si 
with respect to S1^ it must be true that Hi(x, y) — Hi(x, y) > 0 for all y E%. 
This inequality expands and simplifies to 
(biy + di)(x — x) > 0. 
If £ — x > 0, then it must be true that b\y + d\ > 0 for all y E T, however 
y = 0 yields the contradiction d\ > 0. Therefore x — x < 0, and Ui(x,y) — 
IIi(a;, y) > 0 expands and simplifies to 
(3.7) bxy + di < 0 
which is a contradiction at y = k2 since A;2 can have any positive value. 
Therefore no strategy x E Si can be eliminated before fc2. 
Hence there i s a t u G Ti+i such that w strictly dominates k2 with respect 
to T?:. Then H2(x,w) > U2(x, k2) for all x E 5,;. In particular, if x = 0, then 
c2w
2
 > c2&;2 
which is equivalent to \w\ < \k2\. 
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Further, for strategy w to strictly dominate strategy k2 it must be true 
that T\2(ki,w) > Tl2(ki,k2). This inequality expands and simplifies to 
c2w
2
 + b2k\W > c2k\ + b2k{k2 
which is equivalent to 
c2(w2 - k22) + b2ki(w - k2) > 0. 
Since w — k2<0, dividing both sides of the above inequality by w — k2 shows 
U2(ki,w) > n2(/ci, A:2) is equivalent to 
c2(w + k2) + b2kt < 0 
This can be rearranged to produce 
1 / , x b2ki 
k2 \c2\k2 
and since this must hold for any positive value of fci, b2 < 0. This contradicts 
the assumption that b2 > 0. Thus Tkui,k2 is n ° t SDS to (0,0). 
Case 2: 61? 62 < 0. Let Sz x Tj be the last subset of S x T such that S C Si 
and —/, 0 £ T,;. For a strategy £ G <Si+i to strictly dominate a strategy 
x G Si with respect to Si, it must be true that Ui(x,y) — IIi(a;, y) > 0 for 
all y e Tj. As in the above case, this can be shown to be equivalent to 
(3.8) hy + di < 0 
which is a contradiction at y = — I since k2 can have any positive value. 
Therefore no strategy x G Si can be eliminated before —I. 
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Therefore there is a —v £ T?:+1 such that —i; strictly dominates —/ with 
respect to Tt. Then Yl2(x, —v) > n 2 (x , —I) for all x E Si. In particular, if 
x = 0, then 
c2?;2 > c2/2 
which is equivalent to |i;| < |/|. 
As well, for strategy —v to strictly dominate strategy — / it must be true 
that n2(/ci, —v) > n2(fc1, —/). This inequality expands and simplifies to 
c2w
2
 — b2kiv > c2l2 — b2k1l 
which is equivalent to 
c2(v2 - I2) - b2kx{v - I) > 0. 
Since v — I < 0, dividing both sides of the above inequality by v — I shows 
I M ^ I , —v) > n2(fci, —/) is equivalent to 
c2(v + l) -b2k1 < 0 
This can be rearranged to produce 
and, as this must hold for any positive value of ki, b2 > 0. This contradicts 
the assumption that 62 < 0. Thus Tkui)k2 is not SDS to (0,0). • 
The above theorem gives a sufficient and necessary condition for certain 
games to be SDS to a boundary NE, and also demonstrates the increasing 
complexity due to the fact that the game is no longer symmetric when 
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compared with the corresponding Lemma (Lemma 2.11) in Section 2.1. The 
final result in this thesis (Theorem 3.11) is the analogue of Case (1) of 
Theorem 2.12. 
Theorem 3.11. Let Tkl^k2 be a game with payoff' functions II i : 5 x T ^ R 
and n 2 : S x T —> K given by LL(x, y) = ciiX2 + bjxy + cty2 + dix + e^y + f 
where ai7 bi? ci} d7;7 e i ; and /,; are constants, and S = [0, fci] and T = [—1, k2] 
for all choices of hi, k2, / > 0. If ai < 0, c2 < 0, d\ = 0, e2 = 0 then Tkl^^2 
is SDS to 0 if 
4 > M , 
aic2 
Proof. This proof will be divided into three cases. Cases la and lb, where 
&1&2 < 0, follow a similar argument to that in Theorem 3.10. Case 2, where 
fei&2 > 0, is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.8. 
Case la: b\ < 0 and 62 > 0. Consider LI2(x,0) > n2(x, y). Expanded and 
simplified, this inequality is equivalent to 
0 > b2xy + c2y2. 
This is true for all x G S and all y £ T such that y < 0. Therefore any 
strategy y E T such that y < 0 is strictly dominated by y = 0 and can be 
eliminated. Thus let Si x T\ = [0, ki] x [0,A;2]. 
Next, consider Ui(0,y) > Hi(x,y). This inequality is equivalent to 
0 > aix2 + b\xy, 
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which is true for all x <E Si and all y £ T3 provided x 7^  0. Therefore any 
strategy x e S i where x ^ 0 is strictly dominated with respect to Si and 
can be eliminated, resulting in the strategy set S2 x T2 = {0} x [0, k2\. 
Finally, consider II2(0,0) > n2(0, y). This inequality expands and simpli-
fies to 
0 > c2y2. 
This is true for all y <E T2 such that y ^ 0, and so any strategy y E T2 
where y / 0 can be eliminated as a strictly dominated strategy, reducing 
the strategy set to S3 x T3 = {0} x {0}. Thus TklilM is SDS to (0,0) in 
three steps. 
Case lb: &i > 0 and b2 < 0. This case follows a similar argument to the 
above case, except that the change in the signs of b\ and b2 causes the order 
of elimination to differ. In the first step, any strategy y G T where y > 0 
can be eliminated, followed by the elimination of any strategy x £ Si such 
that x ^ 0, and lastly, the elimination of any y 6 T2 where y < 0. Again 
Tklti,k2 is SDS to (0,0) in three steps. 
Case 2: b\b2 > 0. Since M2 — bib2 a\C2 following the same steps (in one 
direction) of Theorem 3.8 produces the desired result that Tkljitk2 is SDS to 
(0,0) in a countable number of steps. • 
4. Conclusion 
Iterated strict dominance is one of the most basic principles in game the-
ory [1]. As a tool for identifying rational behaviour in games, it is clear, 
robust and highly credible. Throughout this thesis, various necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of a strict-dominance solution have 
been discovered and proven. In the simple case of 2 player symmetric games 
whose strategy space is a compact interval, a complete characterization of 
strict-dominance solvability to an interior NE is proven when payoff func-
tions are quadratic (Theorem 2.9). The most important condition for this 
strict-dominance solvability is 2 > |^ | (see Section 2.1 for the meanings of 
the parameters a and b in the quadratic payoff function) that shows that 
strict-dominance solvability is directly related to those terms in the payoff 
function concerning a player's own strategies, rather than those terms that 
concern the strategic choice of the opponent. This same phenomenon shows 
up again for games SDS to boundary NE (Theorem 2.12, as well as oth-
ers in that section) and for interior NE in games with higher order payoff 
functions (Theorem 2.23). This trend appears to generalize to games with 
higher dimensional strategy spaces. 
The requirements for a game to be strict dominance solvable to a boundary 
NE from either side coincide with the requirements for the game to have a 
continuously stable strategy, linking these two solution concepts (Theorems 
2.18 and 2.20). Thus the answer provided by strict-dominance solvability is 
a very convincing prediction of rational behaviour in the game. Again, the 
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most important condition, 2 > A (Theorem 2.18), is still comprised solely 
of those terms that concern a player's own strategy. 
It is not surprising that small changes to the payoff functions of a game 
have little effect on the conditions for strict dominance. When the payoff 
function is of a higher order than quadratic, it is again the terms relating to 
a player's own strategies that must fulfill certain criteria for the game to be 
strict-dominance solvable. When the game is no longer symmetric, the same 
statement is true. The consistency of the requirements for strict-dominance 
solvability of asymmetric games with those for symmetric games can be seen 
from Theorem 3.1 (by setting a\ — c2 and b\ = fc2, see Section 3.1 for the 
definition of the parameters). 
It is clear from the analysis in Section 2.3 on games with multidimensional 
strategy spaces that much work remains to be done on this topic. While 
it appears plausible that a set condition governs whether a game of this 
class is strict-dominance solvable, the complexity of such games renders 
that condition beyond the scope of this thesis. Similarly, further analysis of 
games with higher-order payoff functions, as well as analysis of games with 
non-identical payoff functions for the players could be fruitful. 
These new conditions, when found, can be tested for consistency with 
those already known for the simpler cases, and can be compared to other 
solution concepts such as continuously stable strategies or evolut ionary 
stable strategies. 
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